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The Organ Trail:
Express Versus Presumed Consent as Paths

to Blaze in Solving a Critical Shortage
BY EMILY DENHAM MORRIS*

INTRODUCTION

The summer of 2001 yielded a great medical breakthrough. For the
first time in history, doctors successfully complefed a procedure to
insert a self-contained artificial heart into a patient.' The recipient, a
Kentucky man, had been expected to die within thirty days.2 Since that
time, there have been four successful artificial heart transplants in the
United States.' Although the first recipient recently died, the 151 days he
lived far exceeded the original prediction for how long he could have lived
without the implant The maker of the device is seeking Food and Drug
Administration approval for another ten artificial hearts.'
This technological advance, however, has not abated the need for organ
donors. In fact, other breakthroughs, which have made natural organ
transplants more successful, have increased the need. Sixteen people die
every day waiting for an organ donation even though nearly four times that
number receive an organ transplant each day.6 It follows, then, that the
public health benefits ofincreasing the rate of organ and tissue donation are

*J.D. expected 2003, University of Kentucky. I would like to thank my family

for their support, particularly my wonderful husband for his insightfulness and
encouragement
'John Antczak, Associate Press, 4th Self-ContainedHeartImplanted(Oct. 19,
2001), availableat http://www.canoe.ca/HealthOl10/19_heart-ap.html.
2Recipient ofArtificialHeartDies,Ciii. TRIB., Dec. 1,2001, availableat 2001
WL 30797352.
3CNN, Artifcial-HeartpatientSuffers Stroke (Nov. 14,2001), at http://www.
cnn.com/200
1/HEALTH/1 1/14/artificial.heart.stroke/index.html.
4 Recipient
ofArtificialHeartDies,supra note 2.
S Artificial-HeartPatientSuffers Stroke, supranote 3.
U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., How to Become an Organ and Tissue
Donor,at http://www.organdonor.gov (last visited Mar. 4, 2002).
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substantial. The number of medical breakthroughs using human tissues is
advancing at a rapid rate. For example, today's technology has allowed a
wider variety of organs and tissues to be transplanted (e.g., hand transplants) than ever before. To date, there have been two successful hand
transplants in the United States.7 Promising medical breakthroughs such as
this are all a product of organ and tissue donations. Tissue donations have
also become very important to rehabilitation procedures, such as skin grafts
and bone grafts,' and to scientific research and development.
Tissue donations are distinguished from organ donations by their
lengthier shelf life,9 in addition to a greater variety of types of tissue that
may be procured. 10 Procured tissue may be stored for future use" (as
opposed to immediate transplantation in the recipient, as in the case of
organs), so more tissue is actually available to be used. Also, because most
anyone between the ages of zero and seventy-five can donate, a much wider
pool of potential donors exists for tissue than it does for organs. 2 Tissue
procurement organizations may exist independently or within organ
procurement organizations, 3 though the mechanisms of consent for tissue
procurement are legally identical to those for organ procurement.14
There is a strong public policy towards encouraging both types of
donations, but in the United States the ultimate decision about whether to
become an organ and tissue donor still rests with the individual and/or his
or her family."5 This system of producing organ donors has left a grave
7Hand Transplant:Recipient--Second in

the Nation--GainsFeelingin His
New Left Hand, BLOOD WKLY., Sept. 20, 2001, at 17, available at 2001 WL
7493930.
8See Ky. Organ

DonorAffiliates, Tissue Services, athttp://www.kyorgandonor.

org/tissueservices.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2002).
9Id.
'oSee Am. Ass'n of Tissue Banks, FactsAbout Organ & Tissue Donation,at

http://www.aatb.org/aatbdon.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2001).
" Community Tissue Servs., Introduction, at http://www.cbccts.org/tissue/
default.htm
(last visited Mar. 4, 2002).
2
Id.
13 See generallyAm. Ass'n of Tissue Banks, About the AmericanAssociation
of Tissue Banks, at http://www.aatb.org/aatbintr.htm (last visited Mar. 4,2002) (In
some states eye tissue procurement is an exception to those within organ
procurement organizations.).
14Id.

15 See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. [hereinafter K.R.S.] §§ 311.165 - .325

(Michie 2001). The Kentucky statutes are illustrative because they are heavily
based on the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act of 1968, which has been adopted in
some form by every state. Melissa N. Kurnit, Note, OrganDonationin the United
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shortage. The United Network for Organ Sharing states that there are over
79,000 Americans registered with that organization who, as of February 8,
2002,"' were awaiting organ donations, and another name is added at an
average rate of one every sixteen minutes."
Organ and tissue donations are highly regulated by the federal and state
governments." Since one organ and tissue donor could benefit more than
fifty people, 19 it is important that, in addition to regulating, the government
also encouraged people to become organ donors so that the average life
span and quality of life in this country will increase. There are many
possible solutions to solving the deadly shortage. 20 Congress's answer is
"the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, which was designed to promote public
awareness, health care provider education, and to prohibit the sale of most
human organs."' Some markets for human tissue have already developed
in the United States around blood, tissue, and human reproductive cells,
and at least one commentator believes a free market of vital organs, which
are now banned from sale, could help alleviate the critical shortage.'
This Note discusses the varying methods for encouraging organ
donation in the United States and abroad. Part I explains the current
approach to the law of organ donations in Kentucky as an example of the
express consent method used in the United States.' Part IIlooks at the legal
scheme set up in countries using the presumed consent method.'z This
model is likely the most successful approach worldwide to meet the needs
of organ donation. It has been used with much success in Europe but has
sometimes failed when the law has changed fromvolunteerismto presumed

States: Can We Learnfrom Successes Abroad?, 17 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
405, 410 (1994).
16United Network for Organ Sharing, CriticalData, at http://www.unos.org
Newsroom/critdatamain.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2002).
17Ky. Organ Donor Affiliates, ImportantFacts,at http://www.kyorgandonor.
org/donorinfo.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2002).
18 See generally NORA MACHADO, USING THE BODIES OF THE DEAD 43 (1998)
(discussing recent increases in regulatory activity).
19
Ky. Organ Donor Affiliates, Donationand Those Who WillBenefit, at http://
www.kyorgandonor.org/whobenefits.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2002).
20 Curtis E. Harris & Stephen P. Alcorn, To Solve a Deadly Shortage:
EconomicIncentivesforHuman OrganDonation,16 IssuEs L. &MED. 213 (2001)
(citing Ellis v. Patterson, 859 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1988)).
211d.; see Todd v. Sorrell, 841 F.2d 87 (4th Cir. 1988).
' See Harris & Alcorn, supra note 20, at 213-14.
23 See infra Part I.
24 See infra Part H.
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consent.25 Part III examines the viability of the United States moving to a
presumed consent approach and the potential legal and ethical barriers such
a change could produce.26 This Note concludes by advocating that the
United States place a greater emphasis on organ donation by moving
towards a variation of the presumed consent approach in an effort to benefit
the public health.
I. EXPRESS CONSENT: THE UNITED STATES APPROACH

A. Express Consentand FederalRegulation
Organ donations, from procurement to distribution, are regulated by the
federal and state governments, 27 but the job of educating the public on the
importance of these donations is shared by private and public
organizations. 28 The model in the United States for the procurement of
organs is the express consent approach.29 This method requires express
written consent from the donor during life or express consent from the
close family of the donor after death.30 Distribution of organs is the
responsibility of the United Network for Organ Sharing ("UNOS"), a nonprofit corporation that maintains the national transplant waiting list." A
federal regulation issued by former Secretary of Health and Human
Services Donna Shalala in 1998 set up criteria aimed at allocating donated
organs to patients with greatest medical need, relying less on geographical
preferences. 2 However, several states, including Kentucky, have adopted
statutes that maintain geographical preference by giving the person with the
greatest medical need in the county or state in which the organ was donated
preference over persons outside the county or state. 3
21

See infra Part II.

See infra Part H.
See generally Ky. Organ Donor Affiliates, KODA History, at http://www.
kyorgandonor.org/kodahistory.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2002).
28 See id.; see also U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., How to Become an
Organ and Tissue Donor, availableat http://www.organdonor.gov (last visited
Mar.294,2002).
See, e.g., K.R.S. §§ 311.165 - .325 (Michie 2001).
3D1d.
§§ 311.175, .195.
"See United Network for Organ Sharing, athttp://www.unos.orgAboutwhatmain.htm
(last visited Mar. 7, 2002).
32 U.S. Dep't
of Health & Hum. Servs., HHSRule Callsfor OrganAllocation
Based on Medical Criteria,Not Geography (Mar. 26, 1998), at http://www.hhs.
gov/news/press/1998pres/980326a.html.
33 K.R.S. § 311.236 (Michie 2001); GA. CODE
ANN. § 44-5-143 (2001); Wis.
STAT. § 157.06 (2001).
26

27
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Although organ distribution methods are often in controversy, 4 solving
the deadly shortage poses the greatest public health problem for federal and
state governments. In one of the earliest attempts to deal with the national
organ shortage, Congress passed the National Organ Transplant Act
("NOTA"). 35 This law, enacted in 1984, created the Task Force on Organ
Transplantation in order to examine "the medical, legal, ethical, economic,
and social issues presented by human organ procurement and transplantation."36 NOTA also expressly forbids "any person to knowingly acquire,
receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consideration
for use in human transplantation...

."I' Thus,

the Act prohibits the sale of

organs 3 8 Most

importantly, the Act also granted the Secretary of
human
Health and Human Services the power to create the Organ Procurement and
Transplantation Network ("OPTN"). 3 9
Congress has contracted all administrative authority in the area of
organ donation to the Health Resources and Services Administration
("HRSA"), which is a part of the Department of Health and Human
Services.4 HRSA is in charge of increasing public education and organ
donation rates in the United States, and HRSA's Division of Transplantation oversees the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, which
includes UNOS.4 '
B. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act

Federal regulation and oversight is important so that there is an
overarching system to solve this national public health problem, but each
state must determine its own rules for organ procurement. Every state has
codified laws that regulate how organ donations must be handled in
4 One only needs to remember the controversy surrounding baseball great
Mickey Mantle who got a liver for transplant after only being on the transplant list
for two days. See Judy Foreman, Transplant List Biggest Hurdle: DespiteAge,
Mantle Receives Liver, BosToN GLOBE, June 9, 1995, at 1.
Condition,
31National
Organ Transplant Act, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339 (1984).
36
1d. § 101.
37
1d. § 301.
38 Id.
39

1d. § 201.

40 Oversightof TissueBankingIndustry,10 BIOMEDICALMKT.NEWSL. 54, Dec.

31, 2000, 2000 WL 19818021.
41 Health Resources and Servs. Admin., About the DivisionofTransplantation,

availableat www.hrsa.gov/osp/dotlabout.htm (last visited May 7, 2002).
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accordance with the federal regulations.42 In the 1960s, however, it became
clear that organ donation was a very important issue that needed to have
some degree of consistency among states.43 The National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL"), in 1968, endeavored
to create a model framework for organ donation laws that, by 1973, all
states would use for at least its basic principals.' Kentucky enacted its
version of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act ("UAGA") in 1970. 4
NCCUSL undertook a major revision of the Uniform Anatomical Gift
Act in 1987 ("UAGA of 1987"). 41 The major difference between the 1987
version and the original is that it no longer requires consent by the potential
donor or his/her family. Instead, it replaces the prior method with a
provision that effectively allows the person procuring the organs to take the
organs after a reasonable effort has been made to find the decedent's
medical records and notify the next of kin.47 There was, however, a similar
residuary provision under the 1968 version of the UAGA. 48 The UAGA
gave the power to decide whether or not to donate organs to any person
authorized to dispose of the body if no next of kin or guardian was
located. 49 This provision was called a "residuary authorization" by the
drafters of UAGA of 1987.50 The Comment to the UAGA of 1987 states,
"[tihis residuary authorization in the original Act has been deleted in the
proposed amendments and replaced by the more limited provisions of the
new Section 4. It is a residuary authorization for transplant or therapeutic
purposes only."'" This Comment seeks to limit the importance of the
residuary power vested by the UAGA of 1987 in medical personnel seeking

42 See, e.g.,

COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-34-101 to -209 (West2001); 755 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 50/1 - 50/9 (West 2001); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 194.210-.350
(West 2001); OHiOREv. CODEANN. §§ 2108.01 - .99 (West 2001); and VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 32.1-289 to -297.1 (Michie 2001).
43 Alexandra

K. Glazier, "The BrainDeadPatientWas Kept Alive" and Other
to the Uniform Anatomical

DisturbingMisconceptions; A Callfor Amendments

Gift Act, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 640, 644-45 (2000).
44 Laurel R. Siegel, Comment, Re-engineeringthe Laws ofOrganTransplantation, 49 EMORY L.J. 917, 932 (2000).
41K.RS. §§ 311.165
- .235 (Michie 2001).
4 Glazier, supra note 43, at 645.
47

UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 4 (amended 1987).
4' UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2 (1968).
49Id.
50
UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFt ACT § 4, cmt. (amended 1987).
51

Id.
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to harvest organs.52 One commentator notes, however, that the residuary

authority was largely ignored in practice.53 Now, the UAGA of 1987, with
its addition of Section 4, authoritatively allows the removal of a cadaver's
organs as long as the doctor does not discover contrary intentions on the
part of the family after a reasonable inquiry.
The purpose of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act is to allow anyone
over the age of eighteen to be able to donate his/her entire body, or any part
thereof, for organ donation if he/she has given the requisite written
consent.' The decedent's express wish to become an organ donor is
followed under this provision without the consultation of any other
person.55 It has been noted, though, that in practice, "even if the decedent
has signed a document of gift, and such a document is on his person at the
time of death, hospitals and organ procurement organizations will almost
never retrieve organs without the consent of a person in the highest priority
class available"56 (i.e., the closest relative).
The drafters of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act of 1968 purposely did
not mention any restriction on the commercial sale of organs.57 It was the
view of the NCCUSL that "[u]ntil the matter of payment becomes a
problem of some dimensions, the matter should be left to the decency of
intelligent human beings."58 Many state legislatures, including Kentucky' s,
were unhappy with this omission and, when adopting the UAGA, added
provisions prohibiting the sale of human organs.59 Kentucky's statute
does not interfere with the sale of tissues and body parts other than
organs. 6°
C. Kentucky OrganDonationLaw and Relevant StatutoryInterpretation
of Other States
To supplement its version of the UAGA, Kentucky relies on the
Kentucky Organ Donor Affiliates ("KODA") to provide the Bluegrass
state, as well as southern Indiana and western West Virginia, with an organ
52 Id .
53
DAvID PRICE, LEGAL AND ETHIcAL ASPECTS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION

99 n.67 (2000).
55

UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT

Id. § 2(b) (amended 1987).
56

§§ 1 - 4 (amended 1987).

Glazier, supra note 43, at 645.
supranote 44, at 933.

57 Siegel,

58
rd.

59Id.; K.R.S.

60 K.R.S.

§ 311.171 (Michie 2001).

§ 311.171.
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procurement network.61 KODA was founded on March 2, 1987, and
provides educational as well as procurement services.62 KODA also lobbies
the Kentucky General Assembly for favorable legislation and requests
grants from the federal government and General Assembly so it can
improve the services it offers.63 The functions of organ procurement,
distribution, and education on organ donation are divided between federal
and state and public and private organizations that work together
to meet
64
the demand for transplantable organs through express consent.
Kentucky's law as codified in its statutes is almost identical to the 1968
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act.65 It has not been revised in accordance with
the 1987 modifications.' Kentucky's version of the UAGA provides
several ways for a person over the age of eighteen to make a valid organ
donation. First, a person can donate his/her tissue and organs by will,
regardless of whether or not the will ever gets through probate.67 Second,
the donor can express his/her consent by signing a document other than a
will, which must be signed by the donor and at least two witnesses. 6 Third,
the donor can sign the back of his/her driver's license in the presence of
two witnesses, who also sign. 69 This third method is not part of the 1968
UAGA.70 Last, the statute allows close relatives to grant the requisite
express consent, stating:
(1) Any individual of sound mind and eighteen (18) years of age or

more may give all or any part of his body for any purpose specified in
KRS 311.185, the gift to take effect upon death.
61

See Ky. Organ Donor Affiliates, supra note 27.

62Id.

Kidney Found. of Cent. Ky., Education, www.kfck.org/pages/KFCK
Education.htm (last visited May 7, 2002).
63

6Id.

65 CompareK.R.S. §§ 311.165 - .235, with UNIF.ANATOMICALGIFTACT §§ 1 4 (1968).
66 CompareK.R.S. §§ 311.165 - .235, with UNiF. ANAToMICAL GIFT AcT §§
1-

4 (amended
67 K.R.S.1987).
§311.195.
68

Id.

69Id. Kentucky

is one of many states that allows a person to become an organ
donor while receiving or renewing a drivers license. In total, forty-two states and
the District of Columbia allow it. Health Resources and Servs. Admin., Analysis
of National and State Actions Regarding Organ Donor Registries, at www.
organdonor.gov/analysisdonregistries%20.htm (Nov. 16,2001).
70

Compare K.R.S. § 311.195, with UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFt ACT §§ 1 - 4

(1968).
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(2) Any of the following persons, in order of priority stated, when
persons in prior classes are not available at the time of death, and in the
absence of actual notice of contrary indications by the decedent or actual
notice of opposition by a member of the same or a prior class, may give
all or any part of the decedent's body for any purpose specified in KRS
311.185:
(a) The spouse,
(b) An adult son or daughter,
(c) Either parent,
(d) An adult brother or sister,
(e) A guardian of the person of the decedent at the time of his death,
(f) Any other person authorized or under obligation to dispose of the
body.
(3) If the donee has actual notice of contrary indications by the
decedent or that a gift by a member of a class is opposed by a member of
the same or a prior class, the donee shall not accept the gift. The persons
of this section may make the gift after or
authorized by subsection (2)
71
death.
before
immediately
Many people do not give express consent themselves, and thus the family's
express consent is often implicated. This paradox is often the limiting
factor in the number of organs available for transplantation. Kentucky has
taken a leading role in dealing with this situation through the education of
families in making an informed decision about whether or not to donate the
organs of their loved ones.' Kentucky's leadership role in this area is
illustrated by the fact that it was "the fourth state to pass legislation
requiring hospitals to offer the option of organ and tissue donation to
families of potential donors."'73
Precedent under the UAGA is relatively sparse, as these provisions
have been the subject ofrelatively little litigation nationwide. Several states
do have case law construing the UAGA, though Kentucky is not one of
them. Mansaw v. Midwest OrganBank involved a constitutional challenge
to the Missouri organ donor statute, which, like Kentucky's statute, is based
on the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act.74 In Mansaw, the father of a fifteenyear-old boy filed a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against an
organ bank and a hospital that had removed the organs of his son after his

71 K.R.S. § 311.175.

' See Ky. Organ Donor Affiliates, supranote 27.
7

Id.

74 Mansaw v. Midwest

Organ Bank, 1998 WL 386327 (W.D. Mo. 1998).
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ex-wife, the mother of the boy, gave her consent for the organ procurement.7 5 The father claimed emotional distress due to the harvesting of the
organs and seeing his son's disfigured body.76 The court found that "the

governmental function involved here is of major significance not only to
those currently on waiting lists, but to all persons who may at any time find
themselves or a close family member in desperate need of an organ....
[and] [p]laintiff's interest... is far less compelling."" Thus, one can see
that courts recognize the important role of federal and state governments in
encouraging organ donation to improve the public health of society as a
whole.
Besides the constitutional challenge to the UAGA inMansaw,the other
primary classes of litigation concerning the UAGA involve cases where
more organs or tissues were harvested than the family authorized or
situations where an unauthorized person under the list provided in UAGA
Section 2 consents to the organ donation.7" The outcomes of these cases
almost always favor the organ procurement group under the good faith
immunity clause of the UAGA.79 In Nicoletta v. RochesterEye & Human
PartsBank, Inc., a New York court stated that requiring the hospital to
double check that the person who claimed to be the closest relative was in
fact who they claimed to be "would not only impose an unreasonable duty
upon the Hospital, but would also run afoul of public policy considerations,
as such a decision would tend to jeopardize the whole process of organ
donation by causing unnecessary delays, thereby frustrating the entire

intent of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act.""° The court obviously
751Id. at

*1.

76Id.

' Id. at *7-8. The father's rights were deemed to be a property interest which
is considered to be "a low right on the constitutional totem pole." Id. at *8.
78 See Ramirez v. Health Partners of S. Ariz., 972 P.2d 658 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1998) (The family requested that bone of the deceased not be harvested, but due
to a communication error it was removed.); Hinze v. Baptist Mem'l Hosp., 1990
WL 121138 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (Man purporting to be the deceased grandson
gave permission for the donation of the deceased's eyes, but the man was in fact
not related to the deceased.); Nicolettav. Rochester Eye & Human Parts Bank, Inc.,
519 N.Y.S.2d 928 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (Woman, who claimed to be the wife of
the deceased and who authorized the organ donation, was not the legal spouse of
the deceased.).
79
See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFrAcr § 7(c) (amended 1987). See also Ramirez,
972 P.2d at 658; Hinze, 1990 WL 121138, at *7; and Nicoletta, 519 N.Y.S.2d at
933 (All holding that there was not liability under the good faith immunity clause
of the UAGA.).
81Nicoletta,519 N.Y.S.2d at 932-33.
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recognized the importance to the public health of this country of quickly
obtaining consent so that organ procurement can occur while the organs are
still viable. However, even with such pro-organ donation rulings by courts,
the organ shortage continues.
II. PRESUMED CONSENT: THE EUROPEAN APPROACH
A.

The FrenchModel ofPresumedConsent

Many European countries, and a few others around the world, have
tried to increase organ donation rates by implementing a "presumed
consent" or "opt-out" approach to organ donation.8' Although there are
several varieties of the presumed consent model, the basic premise is that
everyone is considered to be an organ donor unless they have opted out in
a method prescribed by law. 2 One of the first countries to successfully
adopt this approach in an attempt to solve the problem of organ shortages
was France. 3 On December 22, 1976, France passed the Caillavet Law,
which states, in relevant part: "An organ to be used for therapeutic or
scientific purposes may be removed from the cadaver of a person who has
not during his lifetime made known his refusal of such procedure." 4 If,
however, the cadaver is that of a minor or a mentally defective person, the
person's legal representative must authorize any organ removal for
transplantation. 5
This law left ambiguities in interpreting what a person who did not
want to be an organ donor had to do to express his/her wishes.86 This was
Based on the author's research, various countries have implemented presumed consent laws, including- France, Spain, Belgium, Austria, Italy, Switzerland,
81

Greece, Finland, Bulgaria, Denmark, Latvia, Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Portugal,
Poland, Tunisia, Luxembourg, Singapore, Brazil, Norway, Sweden, Slovenia,
Argentina,
and Chile.
8

2See PHILLIP G. WILLIAMS, LIFE FROM DEATH: THE ORGAN AND TISSUE
DONATION AND TRANSPLANTATION SOURCE BOOK WITH FORMS 7 (1989).
83See J.A. Farfor, OrgansforTransplant:

CourageousLegislation,B RT.MED.

J., Feb. 19, 1977, at 497-98. The first country to adopt a presumed consent
approach was probably Norway, which passed similar legislation in 1967, but
there, the family's wishes are still respected if the potential donor left no
instructions. Id.
'4Id. at 497.
85

Id.

86 See Melissa N.

Kumit, Note, OrganDonation in the United States: Can We

Learnfrom Successes Abroad?, 17 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 405, 421 (1994).
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solved on March 31, 1978, when the Council of State, France's highest
advisory and dispute-resolving body, issued a decree allowing the objection
to be made "by any means" and requiring "in effect, that a reasonable effort
be made to determine whether any objections have been registered. .... 87
The Ministry of Health and Social Security later narrowed this law to allow
a third person, often a family member, to state if the potential donor had
any objections."8
This lenient standard for presumed consent has the practical effect of
allowing the family to give express consent much like in the United States,
except with an opposite underlying presumption of donation.8 9 France has
found some success in increasing organ donations because of this law, as
France "now claims one of the top six rates of postmortem donors per
million inhabitants among European countries."9 Because of the Council

of State's modification, which moved French law more toward an express
consent approach, France still faces a critical shortage of organs.9 In 1998,
France had a waiting list consisting of 4950 patients awaiting kidneys,
hearts, livers, and lungs. 92 Belgium changed to a presumed consent law
similar to France's in 1986. 93 Only two percent of the population there has
chosen to opt out, and organ donations rose fifty-five percent in the first
five years after it changed the law. 94
B. Alternative Ways the PresumedConsentModel is Used in Other
EuropeanNations

Some European countries have had more success with more strict
presumed consent laws. Austria has one of the strictest and most effective
of these laws. 95 An Austrian citizen must object to being an organ donor in
writing, and the doctor does not even have to make a "reasonable inquiry"
to discover if the potential donor has opted out.9 6 Therefore, unless the
87

Id. at 421-22.

"SId.at 422.
89 See id.
90 David E. Jefferies, Note, The Body as Commodity: The Use of Markets to
Cure the OrganDeficit, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 621, 636-37 (1998).
91 Harris & Alcorn, supra note 20, at 224.
92 Id.
93 I. Kennedy et al., The Casefor "PresumedConsent" in OrganDonation,351
LANCET
94

Id.

1650, 1651 (1998).

9'See Jefferies, supra note 90, at 639.
96 Id.

2001-2002]

THE ORGAN TRAiL

1137

potential donor is a minor or a foreigner, the doctor does not discuss
donation with the family, and the family can only object by raising the issue
on its own. 7 Even ifthe family makes a written objection, the doctor is free
to ignore it.9" Austria still has an organ deficit due to the great differential
in the supply and demand for organs, but its procurement rates are twice as
high as those in the United States and most of Europe.99 Even if presumed
consent does not totally eliminate the organ deficit, the Austrian example
provides evidence of the potential benefit to public health that occurs in
countries that use presumed consent.
Spain is another country that has a high rate of organ donations." ° In
2000, Spain had one of the highest organ donation rates in Europe with
1345 cadaveric donors, or 33.91 donors per million people. °1 Although
Spain has a presumed consent law, it is not strictly followed, so it is
generally not considered the reason its donation rates are so high. 0 2 In
addition to its law, Spain has created an efficient system in which great
respect is shown for potential donors and their families.0 3 Spain has
increased its organ donation rate by improving many different areas of the
procurement process.Y After adopting its presumed consent law, Spain
created a system of financial incentives' and a large, effective, and very
well-organized infrastructure for organ procurement and transport that is
overseen by an incredibly popular coordinating committee that aids in all
facets of organ donations in Spain.'I
Not all countries attempting to move from an express consent law to a
presumed consent law have done so successfully. Brazil is a prime
example. Prior to 1997, a person needed to give his written consent at a
public office to become an organ donor in Brazil." 7 After the Brazilian

9 Kumit, supra note

98 Jefferies,

86, at 423.
supra note 90, at 639.

9 Id.
100 Organizaci6n Nacional de Trasplantes, Donation and Transplantation
Statictics: Donors by Country. Year 2000, at http://www.msc.es/ontlingldata/f_

data.htm (last visited Apr. 1,2002).
101Id.

102 MACHADO, supra note
'03

18, at 46-47.

Id. at47.

104 Id.
10s Kennedy

et al., supranote 81, at 1650-5 1.

106Xavier Bosch, Spain CelebratesLeadingthe World in OrganDonation,351

LANCET
7 1868

(1998).

o ClIudio Csillag, Opting Out ofOrganDonationin Brazil, 347 LANCET 754
(1996).
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Congress changed the consent law from express to presumed, a person then
could give his/her written objection at a public office in order to opt out of
becoming an organ donor.' The Brazilian Medical Association and the
Federal Council of Medicine criticized this law, and "(m]ost doctors were
unwilling to remove organs without family consent, even if the law
demanded them to do so.""'9 In October of 1998, a little over a year after
the law first changed, Brazil moved back to the express consent
1
approach. 10
Presumed consent can be an effective approach if the citizens of that
country are prepared for it and if there is a good infrastructure such as an
actively involved government agency that coordinates procedures for the
removal, distribution, transportation, and transplantation of organs."'
Although most of the presumed consent countries do not completely meet
the demand for organs, their procurement rates are usually higher than
those of countries without presumed consent laws."' Perhaps Spain's
approach of presumed consent, financial incentives and a governmental
agency is the most effective means of increasing organ donation rates." 3
For example, the rate of organ donation in the Italian province of Tuscany
doubled in one year after adopting a law modeled on Spain's. 14 Results like
this now have other countries currently considering presumed consent laws.
Scotland, for instance, is attempting to increase its organ donation rate by
twenty percent by moving to such an approach." 5
According to UNOS, there were 22,953 total transplants in the United
States in 2001.116 If presumed consent would increase the organ donation
108 CIudio Csillag, Brazil'sLaw on OrganDonationPassed,349 LANCET 482
(1998).
'09 Cldudio Csilag, BrazilAbolishes "PresumedConsent" in OrganDonation,
352 LANCET 1367 (1998).
"Old.
"' See, e.g., supra notes 100-06 and accompanying text. Spain has donation
rates of 33.6 donors per million, compared to the United States, which has rates of
22 donors per million. Christopher Snowbeck, Act lI: GayAIDSActivist andLiver
Transplant Recipient Turns Attention to Raising Awareness ofNeed for Organ
Donation,
PrrTSBURGH PosT-GAzETTE, Jan. 29, 2002, at Fl.
112 See Jefferies, supra note 90, at 639-40.
113 See Bosch, supranote 106, at 1868.
114 Bruno Simini, Tuscany Doubles Organ-DonationRates by Following
Spanish Example, 355 LANCET 476 (2000).
"' Kate Foster, Opt-Out System for Organ Donations a Step Closer,
SCOTsMAN, Oct. 26, 2001, at 2.
116 United Network for Organ Sharing, Critical Data: U.S. Facts About
Transplantation,at http://www.unos.org/Newsroom/critdata main.htm(lastvisited
Feb. 24,2002).
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rate by the conservative twenty percent Scotland predicts," 7 then about
5000 additional transplants could be performed. However, many people in
the United States will die waiting for an organ transplant before presumed
consent becomes a reality in this country. There are substantial hurdles to
overcome in the United States for a presumed consent system to ever take
hold.
E01. BARRIERS TO PRESUMED CONSENT IN THE UNITED STATES

There is no state in the U.S. that currently has a presumed consent law
like those in Europe and elsewhere. However, portions of the presumed
consent approach are present in some state laws."' Although none of these
laws has been declared unconstitutional, there is a question as to whether
a state could, even if public opinion concerns were ignored, pass a law
reversing the current presumption regarding organ donation because of
concerns under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution" 9 and this
country's conception of the body and its tissues as property.
A. Give Me Back My Body: The Body as Property

"But if I had suffered my mother's son to lie in death an unburied corpse,
that would have grieved me.... "12 °-Sophocles

Does anyone have a property right in a dead body? When the United
States abolished slavery with the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, a person could no longer be the property of another. 2 1 Does this
concept change at death? Historically, a relative of the deceased did
not have a property right in the corpse. At English common law, for
example:
17 See Foster, supranote 115, at 2.
18 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-10-621 (2001) (pituitary gland); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 19a-281 (2001) (cornea and pituitary gland); DEL. CODEANN. tit. 29,
§ 4712 (2001) (cornea); FLA. STAT. ch. 732.9185 (2001) (cornea); GA. CODEANN.
§ 31-23-6 (2001) (cornea); K.R.S. § 311.187 (cornea); M.D. CODE ANN., EST. &
TRUSTS § 4-509.1 (2001) (cornea); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.2855 (2001)
(pituitary gland); id. § 333.10202 (2001) (cornea); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-391
(2001) (cornea); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2108.60 (West 2001) (cornea).
j'9

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

0 Sophocles, Antigone, in GREEK DRAMA 92 (Moses Hadas ed., Robert H.
Webb trans., Bantam Books 1982) (1965).
' U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
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no property right existed relative to a dead body, and matters concerning
corpses were left to the ecclesiastical courts. "But though the heir has a
property in the monuments and escutcheons of his ancestors, yet he has
none in their bodies or ashes; nor can he bring any civil action against
such as indecently, at least, if not impiously, violate and disturb their
remains, when dead and buried."'2
The ecclesiastical courts were in charge of taking possession of the body
and deciding any controversies surrounding who and where it should be
interred.'2
Since America never had ecclesiastical courts, states had to make their
own decisions as to whether the next of kin has any property right in a
body. 24 States have split over this issue and either follow the traditional
common law approach' 25 or take a quasi-property view.' 26 Both approaches
recognize the fact that some rights exist in corpses, ensuring a decent burial
for the deceased. Kentucky law has long followed the traditional common
law rule, stating that "[t]he current of authority in this country is to the
effect that there is not a property right to a dead body in a commercial
sense, but there is a right to bury it which the courts of law will recognize
and protect."1 27 States that use this common law approach assume that there
are some rights to corpses, just not property rights.

'

Georgia Lions Eye Bank, Inc. v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127, 128 (Ga. 1985)

(quoting 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 429 (T. Cooley ed., 1899)).
1 Renihan
124Id.

v. Wright, 25 N.E. 822, 824 (Ind. 1890).

'1 See State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188, 1192 (Fla. 1986) ("[T]he next ofkin's
right in a decedent's remains is based upon 'the personal right of the decedent's
next of kin to bury the body rather than any property right in the body itself.'")
(quoting Jackson v. Rupp, 228 So. 2d 916, 918 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969), aff'd,
238 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1970)); Tillman v. Detroit Receiving Hosp., 360 N.W.2d 275,
277 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); Lanigan v. Snowden, 938 S.W.2d 330, 332 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1997); Everman v. Davis, 561 N.E.2d 547, 550 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989)
(holding that a body is not an "effect" of someone else and is not protected by the
constitutional restrictions of search and seizure like property that is considered an
"effect").
126 See Arnaud v. Odom, 870 F.2d 304, 308 (5th Cir. 1989) ("Louisiana has
indeed established a 'quasi-property' right of survivors in the remains of their
deceased relatives."); Renihan, 25 N.E. at 824-25; Teasley v. Thompson, 165
S.W.2d 940, 942 (Ark. 1942).
127 Neighbors v. Neighbors, 65 S.W. 607, 608 (Ky. 1901).
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Conversely, many states developed a "quasi-property" right in
corpses.1 21 In discussing this "quasi-property" interest in a corpse, Dean
Prosser comments,
In most of these cases the courts have talked of a somewhat dubious
"property right" to the body, usually in the next of kin, which did not exist
while the decedent was living, cannot be conveyed, can be used only for
the one purpose of burial, and not only has no pecuniary value but is a
source of liability for funeral expenses. It seems reasonably obvious that
such "property" is something evolved out of thin airto meet the occasion,
and that in reality the personal feelings of the survivors are29 being
protected, under a fiction likely to deceive no one but a lawyer.
Black'sLawDictionarydefines property as "[t]he right to possess, use,
and enjoy a determinate thing...."'0 Usuallyproperty is transferable from
person to person, and in this sense, quasi-property states do not recognize
a commercial market in human corpses and so cannot be said to confer a
per se property right in corpses.' No state allows a market for dead
bodies.' 2 In fact, Georgia, which recognizes the quasi-property right in
corpses, does not allow damages in most cases that are brought when
organs are removed without proper consent because organs have no
pecuniary value.'
B. For Sale, Trade, or Lease: Human Tissues as Property
"And the Lord God caused a deep sleep to fall on Adam, and he slept; and
He took one of his ribs, and closed up the flesh in its place. Then the rib

' 1

See supra note 126.

129

W.L. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF

2

63 (5th ed. 1984) (citations omitted).
TORTS
130 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1232 (7th ed. 1999).
131 Herbert G. Feuerhake, BODY AS PROPERTY, 18 N.Y. JUR. 2D CEMETERIES
AND DEAD BODIES § 72 (1999).
132 It is against federal law to knowingly sell human tissue and organs. See 42
§ 274e(a) (2001).
U.S.C.
33
1 Bauer v. N. Fulton Med. Ctr., Inc., 527 S.E.2d 240, 244-45 (Ga. Ct. App.
1999) (The deceased's corneas were removed without his wife's consent. Her
claims of conversion, improper bailment, and breach of contract failed because
damages could not be proven. The court found that it was not possible to place a
value on Mr. Bauer's parts; however, it did allow Mrs. Bauer to recover for any
additional funeral costs which occurred due to the removal of the eye tissue.).
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which the Lord God had taken from man He made into a woman
34
... ."' -The Bible
Modem medical technological advances have turned human bodies
"from merely a source of labor, or food for worms, to a highly prized
biological commodity."' 35 This technology has also opened up more
questions concerning the exact legal status of tissue. In this respect, bodily
tissues pose similar problems to corpses regarding whether they should be
defined as property.
One of the best-known cases that ruled on the possible property
interests in human tissue is Moore v. Regents of the Universityof California.136 Moore's doctors had taken some of his cells during the removal of
his spleen, and because the cells were unique and potentially possessed
scientific and commercial value, they used them to conduct research. 7
Without Moore's consent, the doctors patented a very lucrative cell line
from his cells for research purposes."3 The California Supreme Court held
that after removal, Moore owned neither his cells nor the cell lines
produced outside of his body.' Other cases, however, have declared that
blood and preembryonic cells may be bought, sold, donated, and devised
by will, 40 all of which are characteristics traditionally embodied in
property.
In dealing with these valuable human tissues, some state legislatures
have enacted laws that have some limited presumed consent tendencies.
Kentucky has such a provision in its version of the Uniform Anatomical

131Genesis2:21-22 (New King James).
135Michael H. Scarmon, Brotherton v.

Cleveland: Property Rights in the
Human Body-Are the Goods Oft Interredwith TheirBones, 37 S.D. L. REV. 429
(1992).
136 Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
37
' Id. at 481.
131
Id. at 481-82.
139 Id. at 487-88.
14oSee, e.g., Hecht v. Super. Ct., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275,281 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)
(holding that the deceased's frozen sperm constituted "property" and could be
willed to his girlfriend); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992)
(holding that a divorcing couple had a quasi-property interest inpreembryonic cells
and could determine their disposition in the divorce); Kass v. Kass, 673 N.Y.S.2d
350 (N.Y. 1998) (couple could expressly contract regarding disposition of
preembryos). Cf Miles, Inc. v. Scripps Clinic & Research Found., 810 F. Supp.
1091 (S.D. Cal. 1993) (holding plaintiff did not have a conversion claim in the
"right to commercialize" a cell line).
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Gift Act that deals with the removal of corneas.1 41 This statute allows the
removal of a cadaver's corneas if an autopsy was ordered, the corneas are
transplantable, the removal will not interfere with an investigation or alter
the face, and "[n]o objection by the next of kin is known by the coroner or
medical examiner."' 4 This statute does not require the coroner to make
reasonable inquiry into whether the decedent had given consent or whether
his/her family would grant express consent to this procedure. In the statute,
the coroner is granted immunity from any cause of action by the next of kin
for removing the corneas without consent. 43
C. IfNot a PropertyRight, Then What is It?:A ConstitutionallyProtected
Interest
"lIMost of those who live in democratic countries are possessed of
property; not only are they possessed of property, but they live in the
condition where men set the greatest store upon their property." 144
-Alexis de Tocqueville
Even though there is no absolute right in the U.S. declaring that a dead
14
body is property, it is clear that some interests are recognized in corpses.
Is this interest enough to create a constitutional barrier to prevent a
presumed consent approach to organ donation from ever being a viable
option in the United States? Under current law, courts have interpreted the
right of a person or family to decide whether or not to donate organs as an
interest sufficient to create some rights in the corpse of which a person
1 46
cannot be deprived without due process of law.
In determining whether or not a property interest is sufficient to trigger
the Due Process Clause of the Constitution, courts have discussed several

141

K.R.S. § 311.187.

142 1d.

§ 311.187(1).
14' Id. § 311.187(2).
'44 ALEXIS DETOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 264 (Richard D. Heffner

ed., Penguin Books 1984) (1835).
'41 See supra Part Ill.A.
'46 See Whaley v. Tuscola, 58 F.3d 111I, 1117 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that
procedural due process rights of the decedent's next of kin were violated when the
decedent's eyeballs were removed without the next of kin's authorization);
Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477,482 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that a widow
had rights in her husband's corpse that rose to the level of a "legitimate claim of
entitlement," thus his comeas could not be removed without her consent).
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different attributes of property. In Board of Regents v. Roth, the United
States Supreme Court stated:
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more
than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral
expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement
to it....

Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution.
Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules
or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state
147
law ....

Courts have found that current state laws have created a property interest
in the next of kin in connection with the body of the deceased, and as such,
due process would be required before the next of kin could be deprived of
this interest.'48
Two of the most important cases in defining a property interest in a
relative's organs are Brotherton v. Cleveland'49 and the follow-up case of
Whaley v. Tuscola.5 In Brotherton, the Sixth Circuit ruled that Ohio state

law recognized a property interest for the widow of a man whose corneas
were removed pursuant to state law, so the removal of those corneas without
due process violated her constitutional rights. 1 The court noted that to make
a successful due process claim, Brotherton must show: (1)deprivation, (2) of
property, (3)under color of state law. 2 The court found the deprivation and
color of state law requirements were easily met, thus the central issue was
whether Brotherton had a property interest in her husband's comeas 3
According to the court, the state procedures that caused the corneas to be
removed without the widow's consent were unconstitutional, depriving
Brotherton of due process." The court found that even though Ohio courts
have avdided classifying corpses as quasi-property, 151Ohio state law, in its
147 Bd. of Regents

v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).

141 SeeBrotherton,923 F.2d at 481-82; Mansaw v. Midwest Organ Bank,

1998

WL 386327,
at *3-4 (W.D. Mo. 1998).
49
1 Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 477.
IoWhaley, 58 F.3d at 1111.
'5 1Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 482.
52
' Id. at 479.
153Id.

154 Id. at 482.

"' See Everman v. Davis, 561 N.E.2d 547, 550 (Ohio Ct.App. 1989); Carney

v. Knollwood Cemetery Ass'n, 514 N.E.2d 430,434-35 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986).
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version of the UAGA, 56 expressly grants a property interest to the next of kin
to control the disposal of the body of the deceased. 57 In addition to Ohio's
version of the UAGA, the court used the "bundle of rights" theory, which,
with respect to property, "include[s] the rights to possess, to use, to exclude,
to profit, and to dispose."' 58 The court concluded that "the aggregate ofrights
granted by the state of Ohio to Deborah Brotherton rises to the level of a
'legitimate claim of entitlement' in Steven Brotherton's body, including
his corneas, protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment."1 59
Four years after Brotherton, the Sixth Circuit decided a similar case
concerning an almost identical fact pattern under Michigan law and came
to the same result. 6 In Whaley v. Tuscola, the court noted that Michigan
law, unlike Ohio law, expressly states that the family can take possession
of the body for burial even though Michigan law only provides for recovery
in tort for infliction of emotional distress in connection with damage to a
corpse.16'Michigan's version of the UAGA is almost identical to Ohio's,
and it is this root in the statutory law that creates the constitutionallyprotected property right. 162 The court stated: "[I]f a woman's husband dies
in a neighbor's yard, the neighbor cannot simply keep the body. In
Michigan, he must either turn it over, or be liable. Just because the woman
cannot technically 'replevin' her husband's body does not mean she has no
63
legitimate claim of entitlement to it.'
Cases such as Brotherton and Whaley seem to recognize that even a
limited presumed consent of organ donations would be a violation of the
due process clause.l 64 Several other courts, however, have come to different
conclusions. Deciding the question beforeBrotherton, the Florida Supreme
Court held that the removal of corneas without the consent of the next of
kin is authorized. 65 The Florida court noted that corneal removal is a small

116

01HO REV. CODE § 2108.02(B) (West 2002) (requiring the next of kin to

provide consent for organ donation).
'17 Brotherton,923 F.2d at 480-82.
'I Id. at 481.
'19 Id. at 482.
160
Whaley v. Tuscola, 58 F.3d 1111 (6th Cir. 1995).
166 Id.at 1115.
1Id.at 1116.
163 Id.
16 See also Mansaw v. Midwest Organ Bank, 1998 WL 386327 (W.D. Mo.
1998) (following Brothertonand concluding that Missouri law is not substantially
different from Ohio law).
165 State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188, 1191 (Fla. 1986).

1146

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 90

intrusion on the body when compared to the large invasion of anutopsy.66
The court found "no taking of private property by state action
67 for a nonpublic purpose in violation of... the Florida Constitution."'
The Fifth Circuit has ruled that there was no liberty or property interest
in the bodies of deceased children based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983.68 The
gruesome facts surrounding that case, Arnaud v. Odom, involve a coroner
who performed a suspect experiment on the corpses of two babies who had
died of Sudden Infant Death Syndrome. 169 Before performing the requisite
autopsy, he dropped each of the babies on its head to examine the damage
such a fall would do to an infant's head. 7 He did this to gain evidence to
clear his name from a previous lawsuit.17' The court decided that even
though Louisiana recognized a "quasi-property" interest in a corpse, this
did not create a property interest as required to activate the Due Process
Clause of the Constitution. 72
Since one of the key factors triggering the Due Process Clause in
Brothertonwas the creation of a property interest by state law, there still
exists the possibility that a state could take out the provisions of its law that
allow families to consent to organ donation. Ifthis were done, then it seems
that due process would not be required, and a law allowing organs to be
removed without consent could be valid.
Some state legislatures have already been faced with the option of
moving to a system of presumed consent. Bills that would implement
presumed consent have been introduced in Pennsylvania, Oregon,
Minnesota, California, and Maryland, but so far, all have failed.'
Currently, legislators in Texas are trying to pass a presumed consent law
to govern anatomical gifts. 74 There is a large amount of opposition to such
a law, though. 75 The United Network for Organ Sharing has stated:
"[E]thically, presumed consent offers inadequate safeguards for protecting
the individual autonomy of prospective donors. [It] too closely approxi166 Id.
7
16
Id. at 1192.

6I Araud

v. Odom, 870 F.2d 304,309 (5th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 306.
170 Id.
'

69

171 Id.

72

Id. at 309.
'73 Todd Ackerman State's Organ ShortfallIs TargetofPlan; Texans Would
Be Assumed WillingDonorsAfterDeath, HOUSTON CHRoN., Jan. 8,2001, at Al 1.
174Id.
175Id.
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mates 'routine salvaging' in practice, although in rhetoric it pays homage
to the value of individualism inherent in the consent model. 176
It is too early to tell if Texas will become the first American state to
move to presumed consent. If it does, there will certainly be litigation
regarding the deprivation of property. If it passes constitutional muster,
there is a good chance that more states will move to the presumed consent
model. Because of the opposition such a change faces just in becoming
law177 as well as the litigation a move to presumed consent would bring,
such a change does not seem likely for years and perhaps decades to come.
CONCLUSION

Advances in medical technology may one day make the need for human
organ donors obsolete. Current technology is focusing on porcine organ
transplants 78 and human cloning to grow spare organs for transplantation. 17 9These technologies are years down the line, and until then, tens of
thousands of people worldwide will die waiting for life-saving transplants.
Education and public awareness campaigns addressing the need for organ
donors can only go so far. These public health concerns should force
legislatures in the United States to discover ways to facilitate organ
donation.
One place for the legislatures to look is at successes abroad. There are
many models for different types of consent around the world. China, for
example, procures the organs of executed prisoners, a practice known as
organ conscription.8 0 There are also many other approaches that countries
have adopted to meet the demand for organs short of mandatory procurement. Discussing the varieties oforgan donation schemes, one commentator
has noted:
The available laws can be grouped along a spectrum based on the level of
consent needed. At one end of the spectrum, reflecting a universal custom
and heritage, the surviving family has controlling authority to donate a
loved one's organ and tissues. At the other, unless an objection is

176 Id.
177 Id.

CBS EveningNews: ConcernsAbout Animal to Human Transplants(CBS
television broadcast, Feb. 13, 2002), availableat 2002 WL 6516535.
7 Aaron Zitner, States Hurry to Block Plans to Clone Humans, L.A. TIMES,
178

Jan. 17, 2002, at A14.

"' PRICE, supra note 53, at 83.
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registered prior to death, organs and tissues are routinely removed as
needed. Geographically, culturally and philosophically, Asian and Latin
American countries are overwhelmingly concentrated in the former group
whilst continental European nations constitute most of the presumed
consent. Countries with a strong English or American legal heritage tend
18 1
to a more middle course.
The trend of Anglo-American law striking a middle ground in
regulating organ donation no doubt has something to do with the conflicting notions in this field which require the balancing of personal property
rights with the societal benefit of improving the lives of others. American
courts often favor organ procurement agencies in lawsuits in order to
facilitate organ donations.' 2 To benefit the public health, laws need to be
written which would de-emphasize the next of kin's property interest in the
deceased corpse while still allowing a burial in accordance with the
family's wishes. Bodies now have a utility after death that they never had
before: they possess the ability to save lives. Public health laws need to be
rewritten to reflect that change.
The gap between organs needed and organs collected under the express
consent approach keeps widening at an astounding rate resulting in a
negative impact on the health of the population. While the presumed
consent approach, in all its different forms, does not completely meet
demand, it comes closer to meeting demand than does express consent. A
hybrid of presumed consent and greater education and infrastructure in
handling organ donations, like that of Spain, would help close the gap
between the supply and demand of organ donors and would have a positive
impact on public health in general.8 3I The law in America must respond to
the deadly gap by creating a system utilizing methods that have helped to
alleviate the chronic shortage of organs in other countries around the world
while staying within the constitutional framework and acknowledging the
value of a person's property, whether a dead body is deemed to be property
or not.
,I Id. at 86 n.14 (quoting Lee, WorldwideLegal Requirementsfor Obtaining
Corneas,
11 CORNEA 102, 105 (1992)).
112 See Ramirez v. Health Partners of S. Ariz., 972 P.2d 658, 666-67 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1998); see also Hinze v. Baptist Mem'l Hosp., 1990 WL 121138 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1990); Bauer v. N. Fulton Med. Ctr., Inc., 527 S.E.2d 240 (Ga. Ct. App.
1999); Nicoletta v. Rochester Eye and Human Parts Bank, Inc., 519 N.Y.S.2d 928
(N.Y.
App. Div. 1987).
18 3 See supra notes 100-06 and accompanying text.
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Future schemes addressing ways to solve the shortage of organ
donations must be cognizant of the rapid increase in new technologies,
which create the need for compatible laws. One problem with most of the
regulations passed and common law rules set out by courts regarding organ
and tissue donation has been short-sightedness when dealing with future
technological advances. While courts do not have crystal balls that can
predict the future, the old common law views of property are often not
practicable when dealing with biotechnology, and these laws produce
haphazard results, like the views taken in deciding if the human body is
indeed property. With different states following different rules as to
whether the body is property, residents of one state could be at more or less
of an advantage for receiving an organ donation depending on what that
state's courts have decided.
Some commentators have advocated a market approach for organ
donations.' After all, when the selling of blood and preembryonic tissue
is allowed, the market thrives and the demand is met. 8 The idea of vital
organs going to the highest bidder is repugnant to most people though.
Spain has effectively coupled a presumed consent model with financial
incentives, which has helped to alleviate the shortage of organs.' 86
Pennsylvania has proposed an incentive program whereby partial funeral
expenses of an organ donor would be paid to that person's family.'87

Although this could be an important step in increasing the number of organ
donations, if it were coupled with the presumed consent model there would
be an even greater incentive to donate. Ethical problems exist with this
financial incentive as with any financial incentive for organ donations since
financial matters might override the morals and ethics of people who are in
financial need.
Lawyers who handle estate planning could be in a unique position to
explain the advantages and disadvantages of organ donations to their
clients.' 88 Lawyers can dispel myths and help gain a person's consent
before death so that their last wishes for their body will be carried out.'89
Under the current laws in the United States, the lawyer is possibly in the
best position to educate and help increase the number of organ donations.
1' Harris & Alcorn, supranote 20, at 213.
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Without Going to Medical School, 61 ALA. LAw. 379 (2000).
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Lawyers cannot reach most of the populace, however. The overall health
of Americans would increase with more organ donations, as less people
would die while waiting on the organ transplant list. The approach the
United States takes towards organ procurement is currently leaving a huge
gap between supply and demand. Every nation struggles with this problem.
Some have more effective systems than others. The United States is by far
the world's leader in medical advances; perhaps it is time for the United
States to take a leading role in solving the deadly organ shortage so that this
technology can be used to save more lives. Clearly, until legislative action
is taken to increase organ donation, more people will die.., waiting.

